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abstract: Cooperative breeders often exhibit reproductive skew,
where dominant individuals reproduce more than subordinates. Two
approaches derived from Hamilton’s inclusive fitness model predict
when subordinate behavior is favored over living solitarily. The as-
sured fitness return (AFR) model predicts that subordinates help
when they are highly likely to gain immediate indirect fitness. Trans-
actional skew models predict dominants and subordinates “agree”
on a level of reproductive skew that induces subordinates to join
groups. We show the AFR model to be a special case of transactional
skew models that assumes no direct reproduction by subordinates.
We use data from 11 populations of four wasp species (Polistes,
Liostenogaster) as a test of whether transactional frameworks suffice
to predict when subordinate behavior should be observed in general
and the specific level of skew observed in cooperative groups. The
general prediction is supported; in 10 of 11 cases, transactional mod-
els correctly predict presence or absence of cooperation. In contrast,
the specific prediction is not consistent with the data. Where co-
operation occurs, the model accurately predicts highly biased repro-
ductive skew between full sisters. However, the model also predicts
that distantly related or unrelated females should cooperate with low
skew. This prediction fails: cooperation with high skew is the ob-
served norm. Neither the generalized transactional model nor the
special-case AFR model can explain this significant feature of wasp
sociobiology. Alternative, nontransactional hypotheses such as pa-
rental manipulation and kin recognition errors are discussed.
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Most animals live solitary lives and do not interact co-
operatively with conspecifics beyond what is needed to
find mates and perhaps raise offspring. Outside of the
reproductive season, most interactions with conspecifics
over food and territory are likely to be competitive. This
follows from the Darwinian logic that resources gathered
for oneself go to propagate one’s own genetic interests.
Altruism rewards the genetic interests of others at a cost
to one’s own direct reproductive success. Although they
are in a definite minority, many species nevertheless ex-
hibit spectacular levels of cooperation in group living set-
tings. This often includes facultative or obligate suppres-
sion of reproduction. Indeed, Darwin (1859) viewed sterile
helpers as perhaps the single greatest threat to his theory
of natural selection.
In many species, all group members directly benefit
through reduced predation risk or increased efficiency at
finding food (reviewed in Nonacs 2001). Darwin’s evo-
lutionary problem arises, however, when such groups ex-
hibit consistently unequal sharing of the group benefits
(i.e., skew sensu Keller and Reeve [1994]). This is partic-
ularly true if this skew extends to reproduction, such that
some individuals are far more successful than others. A
solution to Darwin’s dilemma of how reproductive in-
equality can evolve is kin selection (Hamilton 1964). Al-
truistic acts can be adaptive if directed toward individuals
likely to be genetically related. This recaptures Darwin’s
logic of behavior favoring self-interest. Cooperative breed-
ing can evolve as long as inclusive fitness of all group
members is higher than for solitary individuals.
Recently, two general types of models have extended
Hamilton’s basic premise of kin selection by predicting
the ranges of conditions that favor the evolution of co-
operative breeding. These are transactional skew and as-
sured fitness return models (Queller 1989; Gadagkar 1990;
Nonacs 1991, 2002; Reeve and Ratnieks 1993; Reeve et al.
1998b; Johnstone 2000; Reeve and Emlen 2000; Reeve
2001). Transactional skew (TS) models predict cooperation
as a “social contract” between a dominant and a subor-
dinate. Subordinates benefit sufficiently to favor staying
over living solitarily. Dominants retain enough reproduc-
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tion to favor having the subordinate in the group over
evicting it. Head start or assured fitness return (AFR) mod-
els predict that subordinate behavior can evolve when non-
descendent kin have potentially higher survival than direct
offspring. Both TS and AFR models incorporate genetic
and ecological benefits. Subordinates are more likely to
forgo reproduction when relatedness to the dominant is
higher and when working together greatly increases group
success.
Notwithstanding these basic shared similarities, the the-
oretical development and experimental testing of both
models has flowed in almost completely separate tracks.
Studies concerned with TS models have emphasized re-
productive partitioning between individuals with similar
expected future reproductive potential (e.g., wasps emerg-
ing from hibernation to cooperatively initiate nests: Field
et al. 1998; Reeve et al. 2000; Liebert and Starks 2006).
Initially, AFR was modeled across individuals with high
asymmetries in expected future reproductive success (e.g.,
newly emerged wasps deciding to either disperse from their
natal nest or remain as sterile helpers to the queen: Queller
1989; Gadagkar 1990; Nonacs 1991). A situational con-
vergence is clearly evident in several recent studies that
test AFR models during colony initiation (Field et al. 2000;
Shreeves et al. 2003; Tibbetts and Reeve 2003). None of
these studies, however, simultaneously applied their data
to test TS models.
In this article, we pursue two objectives. First, we show
that the AFR model is a special case of the more general
TS models. Second, we use multiple independent data sets
from studies of cooperative breeding in wasps to test
whether observed cooperation by subordinates is consis-
tent with a transactional framework.
Deriving a Skew Model for the
Evolution of Cooperation
Variants of TS models differ in assumptions about the
degree to which dominants and subordinates control each
other’s reproduction (Johnstone 2000; Reeve 2000; Reeve
and Keller 2001). Previous treatments (e.g., Reeve and
Keller 2001) have differentiated the variants as either
“transactional,” when the dominant or subordinate allo-
cates skew (concession, restraint, and bidding game mod-
els), or “compromise,” when the parties both have some
measure of control (“tug-of-war” model). Common to all
variants, however, is the basic stability condition under
which it is simultaneously advantageous for an individual
to be a reproductive subordinate and for a dominant to
allow that subordinate into the group (Nonacs 2001).
Therefore, in this article we define all the models that
derive from Reeve and Ratnieks’s (1993) original for-
mulation as being in the TS framework. All such TS models
predict that stable cooperation is possible only within an
allowable and defined range of reproductive skew. One
end of the range is bounded by the minimum proportion
of a group’s total direct reproduction required by a sub-
ordinate to join a dominant (pmin). When modified to
apply to all group sizes (the N-person transactional model
of Reeve and Emlen [2000]), the predicted minimum to
be divided equally by n subordinates is
n{x  r[k  (n 1)x  x ]}s n s dp ≥ , (1)min k (1 r)n
where kn is the productivity of a group with one dominant
and n subordinates. The productivity of the dominant and
subordinates by themselves is xd and xs, respectively, and
r is the genetic relatedness of the other individuals in the
group (all assumed to be equally related) to the potential
subordinate. The other bound is the maximum proportion
of reproduction that a dominant would be willing to share
(pmax). Again, extending Reeve and Ratnieks’s (1993)
model to groups with n subordinates gives
(k  nrx  x )n s dp ≥ (2)max k (1 r)n
to all subordinates combined. Cooperation is possible only
when . This condition can be met only ifp ≥ pmax min
k ≥ x  nx . (3)n d s
This minimum stability condition is independent of ge-
netic relatedness or whichever party controls reproduction.
Productivity terms in equations (1)–(3) are the products
of the number of offspring (b) and survival (s) of single
individuals or groups with n subordinates, such that
, , and . If dominants and sub-x p b s x p b s k p b ss s s d d d n n n
ordinates do equally well by themselves ( ), a groupx p xd s
of a given size can be stable if . In otherk /x ≥ n 1n s
words, the ratio of the productivity of a stable group rel-
ative to single individuals has to exceed the group size.
Once the stability condition is met, the difference between
pmax and pmin is the range of reproductive skew over which
a stable association is possible. The size of this range does
depend on genetic relatedness. Thus, equation (3) predicts
qualitatively whether cooperation is possible, and equa-
tions (1) and (2) predict the range of quantitative skews
that is possible for individuals of any given relatedness
value.
Nonacs (2001, 2002) also showed that, in social Hy-
menoptera, cooperation can be favored with lower values
of pmin and kn if cooperating females gain benefits from
manipulating sex ratios on their nests. In Hymenoptera,
full sisters are three times more related to each other than
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they are to their brothers. Thus, if a colony is composed
of a singly mated female (monogynous) and her daughter
workers, the workers are favored to produce a 3 : 1 female-
biased investment ratio to reflect this genetic asymmetry
(Trivers and Hare 1976). In contrast, if the workers come
from multiple mothers (polygynous), this genetic asym-
metry is reduced or absent. Boomsma and Grafen (1990)
showed that if a single population has both monogynous
and polygynous nests, sex investment conflict is possible.
Monogynous nests should favor females, while polygynous
nests should favor males. Thus, in social Hymenoptera,
equations (1)–(3) absolutely hold only when investment
at the population level is equal in females and males. If it
is not, the equations must include both population fre-
quencies of the sexes and their reproductive values (No-
nacs 2001, 2002). Accordingly, an individual should favor
being a subordinate when
k f g n g nn s d F s M (1 f ) p s min( )[ ]n F M
k fg n g nn f F m M(n 1)  (1 f ) (1 p ) ≥min( )[ ]n F M
′f g n g nd F s M′x  (1 f )  (4)s[ ]F M
′f g n g nf F m M′(n 2)x  (1 f ) s[ ]F M
′f g n g nf F m M′x  (1 f ) ,d[ ]F M
where fs, f, and f
′ are the proportional investment in
daughters for an individual reproducing as a subordinate,
the proportional investment in daughters by all other fe-
males in the group, and the proportion of daughters pro-
duced by solitary females, respectively. Relatedness values
to daughters and sons (gd, gs) are always 0.5 and 1, re-
spectively (Crozier and Pamilo 1996). Relatedness values
to daughters and sons of other females (gf , gm) are variable.
Female and male reproductive values (nF, nM) are always
2 and 1, respectively (Crozier and Pamilo 1996), with F
and M as the frequencies of females and males across the
entire population.
From the perspective of a potential subordinate, the first
term on the left-hand side of equation (4) is its direct
fitness as a group member. The second term is its indirect
fitness through the reproduction of the other subordinates
and the dominant. The three terms on the right are the
inclusive fitness of the potential subordinate if all indi-
viduals reproduce solitarily (i.e., it follows in this deri-
vation that if it is disadvantageous for one individual to
be a subordinate, it will be similarly disadvantageous for
all other potential subordinates). Cooperation by n 1
individuals is thus favored if the sum of the terms on the
left exceeds the sum of the terms on the right.
Reconciling AFR with Transactional Skew Models
The second set of models for the evolution of cooperative
breeding is known as the head start or assured fitness
return models (Queller 1989; Gadagkar 1990). The pri-
mary assumption with AFR is that a group with n sub-
ordinates can have both more offspring and higher sur-
vival of offspring to independence than single individuals
( , ). Nonacs (1991) modified Gadagkar’sb 1 b s 1 sn s n s
model for AFR to include the possibility that each ad-
ditional joiner has a differential effect on b and s values.
Thus the stability condition for joining to be favored is
rb (s  s ) r(b  b )s  (n 1)rb s ≥ b s . (5)s n s n s n s s s s
The term on the right is the fitness of the potential joiner
if it is alone. The first term on the left is the increase in
the survival of the dominant’s original brood by having
n subordinates on the nest. The second term is the in-
crease in the number of extra brood (due to having n
subordinates) multiplied by the survival rate of the
group. The third term is the direct reproduction given
up by all the other subordinates. Rearranging equation
(5) gives
b ss sr ≥ . (6)
b s  nb sn n s s
Gadagkar’s AFR model explicitly includes both gains for
increased offspring number and survival. However, tests
of AFR have sometimes split the factors as if they were
alternative models. Assured fitness has been equated with
whether gains in b are maintained after the death of sub-
ordinates (Shreeves et al. 2003), and gains in s have been
equated to “survivorship insurance” (Reeve and Nonacs
1997; Tibbetts and Reeve 2003). Although from an evo-
lutionary perspective there is no reason to expect the fac-
tors to operate separately, there is a heuristic value in
understanding the mechanistic differences in how coop-
eration can be favored.
It can be shown that the stability condition for the AFR
model is a special case of TS models with (i.e.,p p 0min
AFR as formulated in eq. [5] assumes that all the repro-
duction in the joined nest is by the dominant and that
dominants and subordinates are equally successful on their
own). Substituting and into equation (1)p p 0 x p xmin d s
results in
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x sr ≥ . (7)
k  nxn s
This equation is identical to equation (6) when xs and kn
values are replaced with their component b and s values.
Therefore, given the greater generality of TS models, the
analyses in this article will be only in the context of skew
models. The key point we make, however, is that testing
for the group stability of a TS model invariably tests for
the same in an AFR model. The reverse is not true. Show-
ing that cooperation is not favored with does notp p 0min
rule out the possibility that cooperation could be stable at
some .p 1 0min
Calculating Inclusive Fitness of Subordinate Behavior
Measures of reproductive skew within groups have to vary-
ing degrees supported TS models (Reeve 2001; Reeve and
Keller 2001). None of these reproductive skew studies,
however, has explicitly addressed the question of whether
the subordinate has the same or greater fitness than a
solitary female. It is possible to address this question in
11 populations of four species of wasps, Polistes dominulus,
Polistes fuscatus, Polistes aurifer, and Liostenogaster flavo-
lineata. Tests of skew models have also been done in Polistes
bellicosus (Field et al. 1998) and Polistes carolina (Seppa¨ et
al. 2002). However, these studies did not contain specific
data on survival and productivity for both solitary- and
multiple-female colonies. We first test the general predic-
tion of TS models that, in populations of wasps with sig-
nificant numbers of multifemale nests, the stability con-
dition of equation (3) will hold. This prediction is general
in the sense that it directly follows from Hamilton’s rule
and does not predict how reproduction is apportioned or
what level of skew is possible. We then test the specific
predictions of transactional models that observed levels of
skew between full sisters, cousins, and unrelated females
fall within the boundaries of equations (1) and (2) or as
these boundaries are modified by equation (4). We cannot
quantitatively predict a single numerical skew value for
each population because such predictions are based on
knowing the relative level of control dominants and sub-
ordinates have over each other’s reproduction within the
group (Johnstone 2000). However, the absolute range of
possible skews (pmin to pmax) is independent of all as-
sumptions of reproductive control. Hence, support for the
specific predictions will result if observed levels of repro-
ductive skew fall within predicted ranges.
General Methods across All Studies
In most of the data sets considered here, there are no
relatedness estimates for any pairs of cooperating wasps.
This is not, however, a limitation to testing TS models. In
all the species of wasps considered, one or several coop-
erating females initiate nests. Cooperating females are
likely to be in one of three relationships. They could be
full siblings ( , , ). Theyrp 0.75 g p 0.375 g p 0.75f m
could be cousins produced by cooperating full siblings
( , , ). Note that be-rp 0.1875 g p 0.09375 g p 0.1875f m
cause wasps tend to mate with only one male, half-sibs
are rare (Queller et al. 2000). Finally, the cooperators could
be unrelated. Thus, in testing TS models we simply need
to examine each set of relatedness values. Using values of
b and s derived from the field studies (see below), we
calculated from equations (1) and (2) the pmin and pmax for
a single subordinate in a two-female nest and, if possible,
for subordinates in a three-female nest. Although four or
more cooperating females are found together, such nests
were either rare in the studied population or the numbers
of subordinates were lumped into categories. Thus, we did
not have full confidence in having comparative estimates
of b and s with more than two subordinates.
In this initial analysis, we assumed that populations had
either 1 : 1 sex investment ratios or that all nest types
produced the same investment ratios. Under this scenario,
cooperation is adaptive if equation (3) holds. This scenario
is the most restrictive for favoring cooperation. As shown
by Nonacs (2002), cooperation between females can be-
come more likely if there are sex ratio investment conflicts
with workers. Unfortunately, we do not know whether any
of the studied populations were female biased and whether
multifemale colonies eventually produced relatively more
male offspring than single-female colonies. Nevertheless,
we can overcome this lack of information by testing trans-
actional models with female-biased populations, as de-
scribed in equation (4).
To do so, we assumed that for a particular level of
relatedness between cooperating females (full sister,
cousin, or unrelated) colonies maximize their fitness by
producing broods of all males. Thus, , ,′f p fp 0 f p Fs
and . Subordinate reproduction, however, mayMp 1 F
occur early in the colony life cycle (Reeve et al. 1998a,
2000). If early male production is not possible, then a
subordinate female’s only direct reproductive option will
be to produce daughters, resulting in . We pairedf p 1s
these two endpoints of subordinate investment ratios with
two levels of dominant control over their investments:
complete control of sex ratio (resulting in the optimal
in female-biased populations) and weak control thatfp 0
would produce less female-biased offspring ratios than in
the population as a whole ( , when ). We′fp 0.6 f ≥ 0.6
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Figure 1: Last observed nest size of single-, double-, and triple-female
nests in the 1991 Polistes dominulus population in Boston. Regression
lines are shown for each group size.
then solved for the minimum population-level female bias
(F) that would produce for subordinate co-p p 0.2min
operation in each of the four possible combinations of
subordinate and dominant male investment patterns. A
pmin value of 0.2 was chosen because recent field data show
subordinates may get some direct reproduction in the pres-
ence of a dominant, but they rarely get more than 20%
(Field et al. 1998; Queller et al. 2000; Reeve et al. 2000;
Liebert and Starks 2006).
Each field study provides measures for nest survival (s)
and offspring number (b) of single- and multifemale nests.
We assume that dominants and subordinates would have
done equally well as solitary females ( ). Thus,b s p b sd d s s
predicting cooperation depends on the relative productiv-
ity of groups versus solitary individuals (the ratio of bnsn
to bsss). Although we accept the field measures as accurate,
there is notable variation across nests in size. Likewise,
there is some variation across populations in nest survival.
Therefore, we calculated the 95% confidence intervals
(CIs) from the population data for bs and then the CIs of
the ratio of productivity of a pair of wasps to a single wasp
( ). The latter CIs estimate how likely a given popu-k /x1 s
lation is to fit a transactional model. For example, in nests
with one subordinate, if the mean ratio value of isk /x1 s
!2 and the 95% CI does not include 2, then the model
would strongly predict that cooperation in the population
would be rare. Conversely, if the entire CI range is 12,
then cooperation is predicted to be common. Varying pro-
ductivity of multifemale nests or the survival of nests
would have similar effects to varying bs. Unfortunately, for
most of the populations, CIs for these values are not as
reliably estimated. Therefore, these were held constant for
simplicity in this analysis.
Each study differed in methodology and thus in how
relative b and s values could be calculated. Eight popu-
lations of P. dominulus were reported across three articles
and from previously unpublished census information. Ad-
ditionally, reproductive success was measured in one pop-
ulation each of P. fuscatus, P. aurifer, and L. flavolineata.
For each, we describe how we derive our productivity
estimates.
Nonacs and Reeve (1995)
Nonacs and Reeve’s (1995) study followed 195 naturally
initiated nests of P. dominulus in the Boston area in 1991.
Growth rates for single- and multifemale nests were mea-
sured across the season. Individual nests, however, were
often removed for experimental purposes, so the relative
success of each nest type was not measured at the end of
the season or when workers started to emerge. Therefore,
to compare reproductive success, we regress nest size
against the last day it was measured and the number of
females on the nest (fig. 1). In a stepwise regression, both
date and number of females were significant in the equa-
tion. Offspring number (table 1) is estimated for day 50
from the resulting equation: bp 9.487 0.891(day)
. The confidence interval for the nest size (bs)11.549(n 1)
of a single female was estimated from the regression as
described by Sokal and Rohlf (1995) with anddayp 50
. Survival was estimated from unmanipulated nests.np 0
Nonacs and Reeve (1993) reported that nest survival rates
varied across the season in relation to the demands re-
quired to take care of offspring at different stages of de-
velopment. A single female was estimated to have a 0.36
probability of survival until worker emergence. To get a
similar estimate for multifemale nests, we assume the dom-
inant wasp does not forage for food and therefore has a
daily survival rate of 1. Subordinates do all of the dan-
gerous foraging and have a daily survival rate equal to that
of single females. If all the subordinates die, the dominant
assumes their work and their survival rate. We did a Mar-
kov process to calculate the probability that at least one
adult survives until worker emergence by working back-
ward over an estimate of 39 days from laying the first egg
to worker emergence (data from Nonacs and Reeve 1993).
This yields and 0.91 for nests with one or twosp 0.72
subordinates, respectively. This method probably under-
estimates multifemale nest mortality in one way because
dominants probably have a greater than zero probability
of dying in the presence of subordinates. However, this
may be balanced by overestimating dominant mortality if
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Table 1: Range of reproductive skew for potentially stable associations of full sisters, cousins, or unrelated females
Study, n bs ss bn sn kn/xs
r p 0.75 r p 0.1875 r p 0
pmin pmax pmin pmax pmin pmax
Polistes dominulus (USA):
Nonacs and Reeve 1995
1 46.6 .36 58.2 .72 2.50 .000 1.000 .355 .645 .401 .599
2 69.7 .91 3.78 .000 1.000 .434 .783 .529 .736
Tibbetts and Reeve 2003 (Boston)
1 35.0 .42 46.2 .71 2.23 .137 .863 .424 .576 .448 .552
2 57.2 .85 3.32 .026 .987 .558 .721 .603 .699
Tibbetts and Reeve 2003 (Ithaca)
1 88.0 .36 124.6 .65 2.56 .000 1.000 .341 .659 .391 .609
2 161.2 .80 4.07 .000 1.000 .370 .815 .491 .754
Starks (Carlisle, 1996)
1 41.9 .44 78.4 .92 3.91 .000 1.000 .143 .857 .256 .744
Starks (Ithaca, 1996)
1 40.8 .35 106.1 .74 5.50 .000 1.000 .035 .965 .182 .818
Starks (Ithaca, 1997)
1 68.8 .39 116.3 .85 3.68 .000 1.000 .166 .834 .271 .729
Starks (enclosure, 2001)
1 35.9 .65 66.8 1.00 2.86 .000 1.000 .280 .720 .349 .651
Mean: P. dominulus (USA)
1 3.32 .020 .980 .249 .751 .328 .672
P. dominulus (Spain):
Shreeves et al. 2003
1 9.04 .60 13.48 .60 1.49 1.000 .000 .749 .251 .671 .329
Polistes fuscatus:
Starks (Ithaca, 1996)
1 27.4 .45 56.0 .80 3.63 .000 1.000 .171 .829 .275 .725
Polistes aurifer :
Liebert et al. 2005b
1 10.8 .42 10.50 .50 1.16 1.000 .000 1.000 .000 .866 .134
Liostenogaster flavolineata:
Field et al. 2000
1 5.36 .45 10.72 .57 2.53 .000 1.000 .346 .654 .395 .605
2 16.08 .80 5.33 .000 1.000 .173 .913 .375 .813
Note: The range of skew is bounded by the minimum proportion of reproduction (pmin) subordinates must have and the maximum proportion (pmax)
that a dominant is willing to give up. If more than one subordinate is present, pmin and pmax are assumed to be split evenly between them. Expected offspring
number (b) and nest survival rates (s) are given for solitary nests and nests with one or two subordinate females (n). These values are used to calculate
the expected relative productivity of single- and multifemale nests (xs and kn). If , then , and a stable association is possible withink /x ≥ (n 1) p ≥ pn s max min
the ranges of skew values. Study lists the cited reference source of the data, except for Starks’s unpublished results, which give the year of data collection.
all subordinates are gone. Evidence suggests that their
mortality rates are still somewhat lower than solitary fe-
males because they may cannibalize brood rather than
forage (Tibbetts and Reeve 2003).
Tibbetts and Reeve (2003)
Tibbetts and Reeve’s (2003) study followed 51 naturally
initiated nests of P. dominulus in the Boston area in 1993
and 98 nests around Ithaca, New York, in 2000. The goal
was to measure whether subordinates increased nest sur-
vival and whether their offspring contributions were main-
tained after their removal. In both populations, no assured
fitness was demonstrated, but there was significant positive
survival insurance. Both studies included unmanipulated
control nests. These nests can be used to compare fitness
of subordinates with that of single females. In the Boston
population, 16 single-female nests had an average of
(SD) cells just before worker emergence (table35 15
1). Their 95% CI is 8.0 cells. Multifemale nests were
lumped in the data set and had an overall average of 54
cells. Given an average of 1.7 subordinates per multifemale
nest and assuming linear increases in offspring numbers,
this leads to an estimate that the addition of each sub-
ordinate adds 11.2 cells to the nest ( ). Sur-p [54 35]/1.7
vival rate until worker emergence for single-female nests
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was observed as 0.56. This rate, however, is measured for
only approximately the last two-thirds of brood devel-
opment. To estimate survival rate for the entire period,
we calculated from the observed data a daily survival rate
of 0.978, which gives a survival rate (ss) of 0.42 for a 39-
day period from egg laying until worker emergence. Mul-
tifemale nests had a 0.90 survival rate, but no differenti-
ation of this rate across number of subordinates was given.
Relative to single females, this leads to an estimated daily
nest survival rate of 0.996. Extrapolating across the entire
season gives an expected survival of 0.85. Following the
calculations for the Nonacs and Reeve (1995) study, we
attributed two-thirds of this increase to the first subor-
dinate ( ) and one-third to the second subordi-s p 0.711
nate ( ).s p 0.852
In the Ithaca population, 16 of 44 single females sur-
vived from initiation until worker emergence ( ).s p 0.36s
Their average nest size was 88 cells (63 SD), which gives
a 95% CI of 33.6 cells. In comparison, 12 of 15 (p0.8)
multifemale nests survived with at least one female. At-
tributing two-thirds of this increase to the first subordinate
gives and . Multifemale nests pro-s p 0.65 s p 0.801 2
duced an average of 184 cells and averaged 2.62 subor-
dinate females per nest. Therefore, each added subordinate
increased nest size by 36.6 cells ( ).p [184 88]/2.62
Starks 1996–1997 Census Data
Data on female number, colony survival, and colony pro-
ductivity of P. dominulus and P. fuscatus were collected
from Great Brook Farm State Park in Carlisle, Massachu-
setts, in 1996. This population was censused six times
between May and October, the last of which was after
reproductives abandoned their natal nests. Each census
was conducted before foraging activity and collected in-
formation consisting of the presence or absence of marked
females and unmarked workers (workers were not indi-
vidually marked). Cell number was collected during the
final census. There were 34 P. fuscatus nests, 22 of which
were single-female colonies. The likelihood that a single-
female colony survived to produce workers was 45% (10
of 22), and the likelihood that a multifemale colony sur-
vived to produce workers was 80% (8 of 10). Two nests
contained four females each and were excluded from the
analysis. There were 50 P. dominulus nests, 34 of which
were single-female colonies. The likelihood that a single-
female colony survived to produce workers was 44% (15
of 34), and the likelihood that a two-female colony sur-
vived to produce workers was 92% (12 of 13). Three nests
contained three or more females and were excluded from
the analysis.
Data on female number, colony survival, and colony
productivity of P. dominulus were collected from various
locations within Ithaca, New York, in 1996 and 1997. These
nests were censused approximately every 10 days between
May and October, and nest cell counts were taken after
reproductives abandoned nests. Most data collection was
conducted before foraging activity, and data consisted of
the presence or absence of marked females and workers.
In 1996 there were 79 P. dominulus nests, 54 of which were
single-female colonies. The likelihood that a single-female
colony survived to produce workers was 35% (19 of 54),
and the likelihood that a two-female colony survived to
produce workers was 74% (17 of 25). Two nests contained
three females and were excluded from the analysis. In 1997
there were 103 P. dominulus nests, 62 of which were single-
female colonies. The likelihood that a single-female colony
survived to produce workers was 39% (24 of 62), and the
likelihood that a two-female colony survived to produce
workers was 85% (29 of 34). Seven nests contained three
or more females and were excluded from the analysis.
Starks 2001 Enclosure Experiment
Starks’s (2001) study followed 56 naturally initiated nests
of P. dominulus in a large greenhouse in order to examine
the “sit and wait” reproductive tactic (Nonacs and Reeve
1993; Starks 1998). The population contained 38 single-
female nests and 18 multifemale nests. Twelve single-
female nests were experimentally manipulated, and these
nests are removed from analyses. Of the remaining 26
single-female nests, seven failed due to female death and
two nests were successfully usurped; thus . Ofs p 0.65s
the 18 multifemale nests, 100% survived ( ). Ofs p 1.01
these 18 multifemale associations, 10 contained two fe-
males, four contained three females, and four others con-
tained five or more females. Nests with more than two
females were excluded from the analysis. Colony produc-
tivity was determined by counting cells after nest aban-
donment in the late fall.
The significant value of this experiment is that no nest-
ing attempt was missed and nests never failed due to pre-
dation. A potential problem in field studies is that single-
female nests may be less visible than multifemale nests and
may fail relatively more often before being noted. Hence,
the overall success rate of single-female nests may be over-
estimated relative to multifemale nests, leading to under-
estimates for the benefits of cooperation. If this is a sig-
nificant biasing factor, the enclosure experiment would
eliminate the bias and predict larger benefits from co-
operation.
Shreeves et al. (2003)
The Shreeves et al. (2003) study removed P. dominulus
subordinates from nests in Spain in 1999 to measure the
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effects on productivity. In contrast to Tibbetts and Reeve
(2003), they found no survival insurance but almost com-
plete rearing of additional offspring. About 60% of nests
survived from initiation to producing workers with no
significant differences in terms of the number of females
on the nests. Therefore, . A linear relation-s p s p 0.6s n
ship was determined to be the most accurate fit to the
data: preremoval brood . The(b)p 4.60 4.44(n 1)
95% CI for bs could not be calculated from the data given
in the article because single-female nests were measured
at different times of the year, after which the single female
was removed.
Liebert et al. (2005b)
The Liebert et al. (2005b) study followed the success of
58 nests initiated from 1999 to 2001 in a southern Cali-
fornia population of P. aurifer with 86.2% solitary found-
ing. The probability of survival to offspring emergence
was 0.42 for solitary nests ( ) and 0.50 for multiple-np 50
female nests ( ). Productivity of surviving nests wasnp 8
measured directly by marking newly emerged offspring at
censuses conducted every 2–4 days until the end of the
colony cycle. Solitary- and multifemale nests produced an
average of (SD) and offspring,10.82 8.96 10.50 6.56
respectively (table 1). Based on these data, the 95% CI for
solitary nest productivity is 6.0 offspring.
Field et al. (2000)
The Field et al. (2000) study removed subordinates in a
Malaysian population of L. flavolineata in 1998. At the
time of subordinate removal, there was a linear relation-
ship between nest size and group size: brood number
. We calculated a 95% CI of 2.5 cells(b)p 5.36(n 1)
for single-female nest size by estimating regression param-
eters (as in Sokal and Rohlf 1995) from the raw data
presented in their figure 1 (p. 869). Following an unma-
nipulated control population, Shreeves and Field (2002)
reported that single- and two-female nests had respective
survival rates (s) of 0.45 and 0.57.
Results
In all seven North American populations of Polistes dom-
inulus, the population of Polistes fuscatus, and the popu-
lation of Liostenogaster flavolineata, group productivity ex-
ceeds the threshold for predicting cooperation between
females (table 1: and ). In the one pop-k /x 1 2 k /x 1 31 s 2 s
ulation of P. dominulus from Spain (Shreeves et al. 2003)
and in Polistes aurifer, the stability threshold is not met.
Transactional models further predict the range within
which skew values should be observed between individuals
of different relatedness values. Thus, in the nine popula-
tions where cooperation is predicted, a pair of full sisters
could exhibit a wide range of reproductive skew, and sub-
ordinate joining never requires more than 14% of the
reproduction. In contrast, cooperation between pairs of
cousins requires the dominant to cede from 28% to 42%
of the total offspring in five of the nine populations to
attract a subordinate, and in only one of the nine popu-
lations should an unrelated subordinate be willing to co-
operate with fewer than 20% of the offspring. In P. dom-
inulus nests with two subordinates, the subordinates are
predicted to get an even larger proportion of the repro-
duction. In L. flavolineata, two subordinates could poten-
tially get a smaller proportion of the total reproduction.
Benefits from sex ratio conflicts can increase the po-
tential for cooperation. These benefits are differentially
gained, however, depending on the relatedness of the fe-
males and how effective they are at producing males in
overall female-biased populations (table 2). We examined
the effects on the three classes of potential interactants.
Full sisters. For nine of the 11 populations, high skew
associations ( ) can form without any need forp ≤ 0.2min
added benefits from sex ratio conflicts. High skew asso-
ciations can also form in the Spanish population of P.
dominulus and in P. aurifer in strongly female-biased pop-
ulations. Populations have to range from about 66% fe-
male (if both subordinates and dominants produce all-
male offspring) to 90% female (if subordinates produce
only female offspring and dominants produce a 60%
female-biased sex investment ratio).
Cousins. For three populations of P. dominulus and the
P. fuscatus population, high skew associations ( )p ≤ 0.2min
can form without any need for added benefits from sex
ratio conflicts. For the remaining populations, high skew
associations almost always require 160% female bias across
the whole population. Furthermore, in these seven pop-
ulations, if subordinates produce female rather than male
offspring and dominants only weakly control sex ratios,
then no stable cooperation would be predicted.
Unrelated females. Only in Starks’s 1996 Ithaca popu-
lation of P. dominulus can high skew associations (p ≤min
) form without any need for added benefits from sex0.2
ratio conflicts. For the remaining populations, high skew
associations require 61%–88% levels of female bias and
male production by the unrelated females. Unrelated fe-
males should never cooperate if their direct reproduction
will be only daughters in a female-biased population.
The robustness of the previous results also depends on
the variability associated with measures of nest produc-
tivity. The 95% confidence intervals for solitary nest size
(bs) and ratio of productivity of two-female nests versus
solitary nests are shown for each population in figure 2.
Plotted relative to these 95% CIs is the stability criterion
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Table 2: Proportional investment in females at a population level required for subordinates to cooperate with full sisters, cousins,
or unrelated females
Study
All malesa All femalesa
All malesb 60% femalesb All malesb 60% femalesb
.75c .1875c 0c .75c .1875c 0c .75c .1875c 0c .75c .1875c 0c
Nonacs and Reeve 1995 .50 .63 .75 .50 .68 .75 .50 .78 NC .50 NC NC
Tibbetts and Reeve 2003 (Boston) .50 .67 .78 .50 .72 .78 .50 .82 NC .50 NC NC
Tibbetts and Reeve 2003 (Ithaca) .50 .60 .74 .50 .67 .74 .50 .70 NC .50 NC NC
Starks (Carlisle, 1996) .50 .50 .61 .50 .50 .61 .50 .50 NC .50 .50 NC
Starks (Ithaca, 1996) .50 .50 .50 .50 .50 .50 .50 .50 .50 .50 .50 .50
Starks (Ithaca, 1997) .50 .50 .62 .50 .50 .62 .50 .50 NC .50 .50 NC
Starks (enclosure, 2001) .50 .58 .71 .50 .62 .71 .50 .73 NC .50 NC NC
Mean: Polistes dominulus (USA) .50 .57 .68 .50 .60 .68 .50 .65 … .50 … …
Shreeves et al. 2003 .66 .78 .85 .77 .83 .85 .71 .84 NC .86 NC NC
Starks (Carlisle, 1996) .50 .50 .63 .50 .50 .63 .50 .50 NC .50 .50 NC
Liebert et al. 2005b .74 .83 .88 .83 .87 .88 .78 .84 NC .90 NC NC
Field et al. 2000 .50 .63 .75 .50 .68 .75 .50 .78 NC .50 NC NC
Note: Subordinates are assumed to gain direct reproduction ( ). A value of 0.50 means cooperation occurs without a sex ratio bias;p p 0.2min
cooperation is possible with any level of female bias. Data are referenced by study as in table 1.NCp no
a Subordinate reproduction.
b Dominant reproduction.
c Value of r.
line for a two-female nest (from eq. [3], this is k /x p1 s
, with reproduction equally shared). Also plotted in a2
left-to-right progression of lines are the minimum k /x1 s
values that would allow stable high skew associations
( ) of full sisters, cousins, and unrelated females,p ≤ 0.2min
respectively. The mean values of bs varied greatly across
the studies (fig. 2), probably in part due to differing meth-
ods of measuring nest size or success. The magnitude of
bs did not significantly correlate to , which stronglyk /x1 s
suggests that there is not a systematic bias in estimating
the productivity of single-female nests relative to the pro-
ductivity of multifemale nests across the various studies.
The mean and 95% CI of P. aurifer is entirely below
the absolute stability criterion value of 2 (fig. 2). In four
populations, the CIs exclude the possibility of adaptive
high skew associations of cousins and unrelated females
but do not exclude the possibility that full sisters should
also not form such associations. In the remaining five
populations, it is always possible for stable high skew as-
sociations to form between full sisters. Among these five,
four also have the possibility of stable high skew associ-
ations between cousins. In only one population does the
95% CI include the possibility of stable high skew asso-
ciations between unrelated females.
Discussion
Evolution of Cooperation in a Transactional
Skew Framework
Transactional models of cooperation make both primary,
general predictions about whether cooperation is evolu-
tionarily possible and secondary, specific predictions about
how group reproduction is quantitatively divided. A gen-
eral prediction is that groups are sufficiently productive
to favor group living over solitary living. We found that
nine separate populations of three species (Polistes dom-
inulus, Polistes fuscatus, and Liostenogaster flavolineata)
meet this minimum criterion (table 1). In an additional
study on P. dominulus, Liebert and Starks (2006) also
found that cooperation exceeded the minimum criterion
( in their study). In all three species, coop-k /x p 3.071 s
eration in colony initiation is indeed common (Nonacs
and Reeve 1995; Reeve and Nonacs 1997; Field et al. 2000).
One species, Polistes aurifer, does not meet the minimum
criterion. This population, however, rarely exhibits co-
operation between females in nest initiation (Liebert et al.
2005b) and thus is consistent with the TS model. Only
the Spanish population of P. dominulus appears to fail the
general prediction: the population exhibits a high level of
female cooperation (Shreeves et al. 2003), but the TS
model predicts solitary behavior. The estimates for solitary
success for this population, however, are based on rela-
tively few nests that were destroyed as part of an experi-
mental manipulation early in the year. Thus, the success
of single-female nests cannot be considered highly reliable
in this particular study. More seriously, the support for
the general prediction is tempered by the fact that 95%
CIs on the estimates of brood production in single-female
nests in four populations cannot exclude values less than
the minimum criterion for cooperation (fig. 2). Thus, it
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Figure 2: Observed offspring production of single females (bs) relative
to predicting cooperation. The error bars for the Y-axis are 95% confi-
dence intervals (CIs) for offspring production. These CIs are used to
generate the corresponding 95% CIs for k1/xs on the X-axis. Open
dominulus data sets; solid Polistes species;circlesp Polistes circlesp other
open flavolineata. The vertical line atsquaresp Liostenogaster k /x p 21 s
is the minimum for any cooperation to be stable. Proceeding left to right,
the other vertical lines give the k1/xs values required for cooperation with
between full sisters, cousins, and unrelated females,p p 0.2min
respectively.
is possible that as many as five of the 11 populations
presented here may reject this general prediction.
The previous predictions are general because they are
not exclusive to transactional models. Given that coop-
eration creates enough benefit for stable group formation,
TS models make further unique predictions about the re-
sulting sociobiology of the groups. Preeminent among
these is that observed levels of reproductive skew should
occur within the range of values given by equations (1)
and (2). This is a robust prediction across all TS models
that is unaffected by which individuals determine repro-
ductive skew. Therefore, there are no ambiguities as to
whether a particular result supports or rejects a TS model
(e.g., Field et al. 1998; Johnstone 2000; Reeve 2000; Nonacs
2001; Reeve and Keller 2001).
Patterns of cooperation and reproductive skew are well
described in Polistes and Liostenogaster. Cooperating
groups are usually composed of full sisters, but cousins
and unrelated females are not uncommon. Reproductive
skew tends to be high with all patterns of relatedness: the
dominant gets about 80% or more of the offspring if she
survives (Field et al. 1998; Queller et al. 2000; Reeve et al.
2000; Liebert and Starks 2006). Thus, if TS models fail to
predict high skew associations across all levels of relat-
edness, then these models must be rejected.
As far as full sisters are concerned, this specific predic-
tion is supported. Taking into account the confidence in-
tervals on brood production, full sisters are predicted to
cooperate with very high reproductive skews in up to nine
of the 11 populations (fig. 2). The specific prediction, how-
ever, fails when considering cooperation between cousins
or unrelated females. In only four populations do confi-
dence intervals for the ratio of group to solitary produc-
tivity allow for high skew associations between cousins,
and in two of these populations, the 95% CIs include the
possibility that cousins should not cooperate. Finally, in
only one population would a TS model predict that un-
related females could possibly cooperate with high repro-
ductive skews. Thus, cousins and unrelated females seem
unlikely to be maximizing their fitness by joining groups
through a transactional mechanism. Recently, Liebert and
Starks (2006) compared once more in the Boston area the
reproductive success of single- and multifemale P. domi-
nulus nests. Reproductive skew was not significantly af-
fected by relatedness between dominants and subordi-
nates, and it was far higher in low-relatedness nests than
predicted by TS models.
Can the TS model be recouped through factors not
considered in the N-person model of Reeve and Emlen
(2000)? First, Nonacs (2002) showed that if sex ratio con-
flicts are present, cooperation is enhanced by gaining con-
trol of male production. Our analysis here shows that high
skew associations between even unrelated females are pos-
sible if subordinates get to produce male offspring and the
whole population is female biased. Unfortunately, what is
known about these species does not suggest that such con-
ditions are present. Subordinates tend to disappear by the
middle of the colony cycle, and they rarely reproduce after
workers are on the nest (Reeve 1991). Thus, the majority
of their direct reproduction must occur within the first
cohorts of offspring raised while they are on the nest. In
these early cohorts (for Polistes), males are relatively rare,
and thus direct reproduction by subordinates may be lim-
ited to daughters that avoid becoming workers and instead
pursue other reproductive options (Reeve et al. 1998a;
Starks 2001). Populations of species with both single- and
multifemale colonies tend to have roughly equal invest-
ment in females and males (Nonacs 2002). Multifemale
colonies produce more males than single-female colonies,
but they also produce significant numbers of females
(Noonan 1981; Nonacs 2002). Therefore, in a typical mul-
tifemale colony, a subordinate may get a small proportion
of the direct reproduction, mostly as daughters, and lim-
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ited inclusive fitness benefits from dominants being able
to somewhat overproduce male offspring. In summary, sex
ratio conflicts are unlikely to increase incentives for co-
operation enough to explain the behavior of nonsister
females.
Transactional models may predict erroneously low levels
of skew for cooperation if the productivity of solitary fe-
males was consistently overestimated in many of the pop-
ulations. Apart from the Spanish population of P. domi-
nulus this, however, is unlikely for several reasons.
Overcounts of brood numbers (i.e., bs) must be on the
order of 50%–100% for CIs in figure 2 to include the
minimum levels of productivity that would allow high
skew associations. Alternatively, nest survival (ss) could
have been overestimated because single-female nests may
be less noticeable and more likely to fail before being
recorded. This may be a possibility in the tropical species
L. flavolineata, where new nests are started year round.
The Polistes species, however, are all temperate and nests
are initiated in a relatively brief period of time (Reeve
1991). The studies reported here generally followed all
nests from very early in the period of initiation through
the season. It is, therefore, unlikely that there was an un-
observed period of time where solitary females suffered
extreme mortality. Finally, the one study that most closely
controlled and observed nest survival (enclosure study
with P. dominulus; Starks 2001) had a relatively modest
productivity advantage for multifemale nests that was well
within the range observed for the species (table 1; fig 2).
This suggests that if there is a bias, single-female produc-
tivity is underestimated in the field. Therefore, our models
are more likely to err in overestimating the likelihood of
cooperation with high skew.
One other consideration in the transactional framework
is that the expected pmin for a subordinate can rise dra-
matically if she becomes dominant after the death of the
initial dominant (as in Queller et al. 2000). Thus, repro-
ductive success for subordinates would be low in nests
where they remain subordinates but high where they rise
to dominance. The joining decision itself would be based
on the expected mean pmin because subordinates would
not be able to predict dominant turnover. Queller et al.
(2000) observed 110 P. dominulus subordinates on 28
nests. On 11 nests, the dominant disappeared and was
succeeded by a former subordinate. Thus, an unrelated
subordinate has a 10% chance of rising to dominant status
( ). If one assumes total reproductive skew in fa-p 11/110
vor of whichever wasp eventually becomes the dominant,
this equates to an expected mean for unrelatedp p 0.1min
subordinates (i.e., one out of 10 subordinates becomes
dominant and gains 100% of the reproduction). This is
still far below the majority of pmin values predicted by the
TS models (table 1). Other studies found similarly low
probabilities for subordinates to attain dominant status.
Noonan (1981) estimates that only 3% of subordinates in
P. fuscatus become dominants. Hughes and Strassmann
(1988) found that only 0%–11% of subordinates even-
tually became dominants in Polistes exclamans and Polistes
annularis.
The existing evidence in Polistes suggests that queuing
in a dominance hierarchy (Kokko and Johnstone 1999;
Ragsdale 1999) does not pay off often enough by itself to
predict cooperation of distantly related individuals. The
benefits of queuing, however, should be examined in more
species and at the level of the nest (as contrasted to mea-
suring population averages). For example, the potential of
ascension to dominance may favor cooperation if unre-
lated individuals increase their likelihood of becoming
dominant above random chance. If order of joining de-
termines hierarchy, unrelateds should be more likely to
join at times when they are likely to gain a high rank. In
comparison with related subordinates, unrelated individ-
uals should be more aggressive in keeping out later joiners
to reduce competition. Finally, as queue length grows, un-
relateds should be more prone to leaving the group in
search of other reproductive opportunities. Therefore, as
group size increases, the proportion of unrelated individ-
uals in the group should decrease. To date, these predic-
tions have not been tested, and all of them assume un-
related individuals recognize their genetic status.
Because assured fitness return models are subsumed
within the transactional framework, the failure of the latter
also equates with failure of the former in explaining the
evolutionary maintenance of cooperation. AFR models
predicted that ecological constraints on solitary reproduc-
tion in species with extended parental investment were far
stronger selecting agents for cooperation than was height-
ened genetic relatedness (Queller 1989, 1994; Gadagkar
1990). However, the data here suggest only haplodiploid
full sisters potentially gain enough in increased group pro-
ductivity to cooperate without their own direct reproduc-
tion. Thus, the degree to which AFR models are consistent
with the evolution of cooperation in wasps of the same
generation (semisociality; Lin and Michener 1972) seems
to strongly depend on haplodiploidy. However, the current
data do not test the subsocial (multigenerational groups)
evolutionary route to cooperation. Parents often have es-
tablished resources such as nests that offspring would have
to create de novo after dispersing. Thus, can bex 11 xd s
very likely, which in turn would make cooperation between
more distantly related individuals possible (e.g., nieces
helping aunts). Assured fitness models were originally de-
rived in the context of predicting whether offspring
should remain as helpers on their natal nests (Queller
1989; Gadagkar 1990). In such cases, adaptive cooperation
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with across a wide range of relatedness valuesp ≈ 0min
remains to be tested.
Cooperation in Nontransactional Frameworks
Semisocial groups would be favored if some females can-
not reproduce ( due to impotence), which wouldx ≈ 0s
allow them to increase fitness only by helping kin. It is
important to note that the stability condition in equation
(3) applies to both potentially cooperating females and
their mother (or whatever kin raises them). Thus, the de-
liberate creation of sterile “helper” offspring can be adap-
tive from the parents’ perspective. For example, the data
from Nonacs and Reeve (1995) suggest that the relative
productivity of a two-female nest is 2.5 times that of a
single female (table 1). Therefore from a mother’s per-
spective, two nests of cooperating daughters result in fit-
ness equal to five solitary nests. At an individual offspring
level, a sterile daughter that has a 0.67 probability of help-
ing her sister raise 1.5 times more offspring has equal value
to a fertile daughter that nests alone.
Evolutionarily, daughters should resist being manipu-
lated into sterilized helper roles because their fitness would
be higher when retaining reproductive potential (Keller
and Nonacs 1993). Further, it is not clear how parents can
successfully manipulate otherwise robust offspring into
helper roles. Making smaller females does not guarantee
subordinate females. As an example, the size variation
across solitary P. dominulus females spans the variation
observed in multifemale groups. There is, however, no
advantage in being a larger solitary female in terms of nest
construction rate or survival (Nonacs and Reeve 1995).
Rather than size, Gadagkar (1991) argued that many Ro-
palidia marginata females have delayed reproductive mat-
uration. Later experiments failed to demonstrate such
widespread reduced fertility in subordinates (Shakarad and
Gadagkar 1997). Further, Field and Foster (1999) found
no evidence for subfertility in L. flavolineata. Another pos-
sibility is that “delaying” females may be reproductively
capable but following an alternative reproductive tactic of
waiting to usurp established nests (Nonacs and Reeve
1993; Starks 1998, 2001). To date, there is little direct
support for phenotypically manipulated disadvantages cre-
ating subordinate behavior.
Recently, however, Liebert et al. (2005a) found that ge-
netically disadvantaged females may be more common
than previously thought. The authors reported the occur-
rence of triploid females in three different species of Polis-
tes wasps. In one population of P. dominulus, 11.1% of 18
multifemale nests had triploid females. Triploids are sterile
and thus could potentially form a class of females that
gain inclusive fitness only through helping. However, trip-
loids would have to first recognize their own sterility. Sec-
ond, the most likely origin of triploid females is from a
mating with a diploid male (Liebert et al. 2004, 2005a).
Thus, all full sisters would also be triploid, and indirect
fitness could be gained only through locating and joining
cousins or half sisters. Perhaps demonstrating the practical
difficulty of executing such optimal joining decisions, Lie-
bert et al. (2005a) found triploid females only in nesting
associations with unrelated dominants.
An alternative explanation for suboptimal joining be-
havior is that wasps may simply make recognition errors
in identifying sisters. Some such errors are expected with
an acceptance threshold type of mechanism (Reeve 1989;
Liebert and Starks 2004), in which an evaluator wasp ac-
cepts or rejects another based on how well the evaluated
wasp’s cues match the evaluator’s internal kin template.
Evidence suggests that wasps identify former nestmates via
chemical signatures consisting of cuticular hydrocarbons
(reviewed in Gamboa 2004) and that this process can be
facilitated via philopatry after overwintering (Rau 1929;
West-Eberhard 1969; Klahn 1979; Wenzel 1989, 1996;
Starks 2003; Sumana et al. 2005). Even perfectly accurate
recognition of former nestmates may sometimes result in
cooperation with less related or unrelated females because
there is no evidence for intracolonial kin discrimination
in paper wasps (Queller et al. 1990; Strassmann 1996;
Gamboa 2004). Acceptance errors may also be expected
because of mixing or loss of cuticular hydrocarbon sig-
natures during winter diapause (Dapporto et al. 2004). All
this raises the possibility that the proximate mechanisms
wasps use to make joining decisions may preclude the fine
discrimination abilities assumed by skew models. A more
complete model for understanding joining decisions in
wasp societies may require integration of existing inclusive
fitness models with the limits of recognition mechanisms
actually used by the wasps.
Conclusion
Cooperative groups of female wasps are generally pro-
ductive enough that subordinate behavior could be ex-
plained by kin selection. Theoretically, this cooperation
could result either as a social contract between reproduc-
tively capable individuals or as parental manipulation that
creates fertile and less fertile castes of females. Neither of
these explanations, however, is convincingly supported.
The transactional skew models strongly predict that dis-
tantly related or unrelated females should cooperate only
with low levels of skew. This is not observed in natural
populations of paper wasps. The high skews that are ob-
served can be consistent with parental manipulation mod-
els, but there is no evident mechanism for how parents
could create physically robust but sterile offspring that
reliably find and cooperate with kin. We have no adequate
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adaptive explanation for why some female wasps appear
to willingly accept reproductive subordination. We cannot
rule out that cooperation with a distantly related or un-
related female is simply a mistake in recognition. Until we
have a viable explanation, the evolution of cooperative
breeding in Polistes wasps and its derivation into higher
levels of eusociality will remain an unsolved puzzle.
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